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ABSTRACT
Random key predistribution schemes have emerged as a widely
adopted solution for facilitating secure communication in Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSNs). Emerging real world networks in-
creasingly rely on integrating information from sensor nodes with
different resources and requirements. We analyze the strength of
connectivity of a heterogeneousWSN under the random pairwise
key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. According to this scheme,
each of the n sensor nodes is classified as type-1 (respectively, type-
2) with probability µ (respectively, 1 − µ) where 0 < µ < 1. Each
type-1 (respectively, type-2) node is paired with 1 (respectively,
Kn ) other node selected uniformly at random; each pair is then
assigned a unique pairwise key so that they can securely commu-
nicate with each other. A main question in the design of secure
and heterogeneous WSNs is how should the parameters n, µ, and
Kn be selected such that resulting network exhibits certain desir-
able properties with high probability. Of particular interest is the
strength of connectivity often studied in terms of k-connectivity;
i.e., with k = 1, 2, . . ., the property that the network remains con-
nected despite the removal of any k − 1 nodes or links. When the
network is not connected, it is of interest to analyze the size of
its largest connected sub-network. In this paper, we answer these
questions by analyzing the inhomogeneous random K-out graph
model naturally induced under the heterogeneous pairwise scheme.
From the literature on homogeneous K-out graphs wherein all nodes
select Kn neighbors (i.e., µ = 0), it is known that when Kn ≥ 2, the
graph isKn -connected asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) asn gets
large. In the inhomogeneous case (i.e., µ > 0), it was recently estab-
lished that achieving even 1-connectivity a.a.s. requires Kn = ω(1).
Here, we provide a comprehensive set of results to complement
these existing results. First, we establish a sharp zero-one law for
k-connectivity, showing that for the network to be k-connected
a.a.s., we need to set Kn = 11−µ (logn + (k − 2) log logn + ω(1)) for
all k = 2, 3, . . .. Despite such large scaling of Kn being required
for k-connectivity, we also show that merely having Kn ≥ 3 is
sufficient for the graph to contain a.a.s. a connected sub-graph of
size n − O(1); i.e., even with Kn = 3, all but finitely many nodes
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will form a connected sub-network. We provide comprehensive
simulation results to demonstrate the usefulness of our results in
choosing network parameters in the finite node regime.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) form the backbone of several
application domains including environmental sensing, battlefield
surveillance, and healthcare monitoring [1]. The affordability, scal-
ability, low-power consumption, and ease of installation has led to
widespread deployment of WSNs in the past decade [44]. A typical
wireless sensor network comprises of a collection of distributed
sensor nodes with limited communication and communication ca-
pabilities. The limited computation and communication capabilities
of WSNs precludes the use of traditional key exchange and distribu-
tion protocols to safeguard these networks [14, 25, 31]. Moreover,
WSNs are often deployed for sensitive applications in hostile envi-
ronments making them susceptible to adversarial attacks.
In their seminal work, Eschenauer and Gligor [14] addressed the
issue of facilitating security inWSNs by introducing a scheme based
on random predistribution of symmetric keys. Subsequently, several
variants of the random key predistribution approach emerged; e.g.,
see [32, 34] and the references therein. Among them is a widely
adopted approach called the random pairwise key predistribution
scheme by Chan et al. [5]. The random pairwise scheme is imple-
mented in two phases. In the first phase, each sensor node is paired
offlinewith K distinct nodes chosen uniformly at random among all
other sensor nodes. Next, a unique pairwise key is inserted in the
memory modules of each of the paired sensors. After deployment,
two sensor nodes can communicate securely only if they have at
least one key in common. In Section 2, we provide more details
about the implementation of this scheme and its heterogeneous
variant introduced in [10]. The major advantages of the pairwise
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Figure 1: AWSN with 6 nodes secured by the heterogeneous
random pairwise key predistribution scheme. Each type-1
(resp. type-2) node randomly selects 1 (resp. K = 2) node
and a unique pairwise key is given to node pairs per selec-
tion; in this example, nodesA,C and E are type-2 and the rest
(B,D, F ) are type-1. Two nodes can communicate securely if
they have at least one key in common. This induces a graph
with edges corresponding to node pairs that share a key.
scheme include resilience against node capture and replication
attacks as well as enabling quorum-based key revocation.
When all sensors can communicate with each other meaning that
one-hop secure communication between a pair of sensors hinges
solely on them having a common key, pairwise scheme induces a
class of random graphs known as randomK-out graphs [3, 16, 40, 42]
constructed as follows. Each of the n nodes draws K arcs towards K
distinct nodes chosen uniformly at random among all others. The
orientation of the arcs is then ignored, yielding an undirected graph.
Let H(n;K) denote the resulting random K-out graph whose
edges represent the secure communication links of the correspond-
ing WSN. A key question in the design of secure WSNs under a
random key predistribution scheme is how to set the scheme param-
eters so that the resulting network has certain desirable properties
with high probability; e.g., connectivity [14, 27, 36, 39, 40], relia-
bility against node/edge failures [42, 43, 46, 49], resilience against
node capture attacks [23, 41], containing a connected sub-network
with a large number of nodes [2, 23], etc. Some of these questions
have been answered for the standard (i.e., homogeneous) pairwise
scheme through analyzing random K-out graphs. In particular, it
was shown [16, 40] that if K ≥ 2, then the resulting graph is 1-
connected with high probability. More precisely, the following zero-
one law holds:
lim
n→∞P [H(n;K) is connected] =
{
1 if K ≥ 2,
0 if K = 1.
Recently deployed networks are increasingly relying on integrat-
ing information from sensor nodes with widely varying resources
and requirements [22, 33, 35]. The increasing adoption of heteroge-
neous designs has also been in response to the poor performance
and scalability of homogeneous ad-hoc networks; see [7] and the
references therein. A growing body of literature is now analyzing
heterogeneous variants of classical key predistribution schemes
[7, 9–11, 37].
In order to design a secure network comprising of nodes with
differing capabilities, [10] introduced a heterogeneous pairwise
key predistribution scheme in which each node is classified as
type-1 (respectively, type-2) with probability µ (respectively, 1 − µ),
0 < µ < 1. Then, each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node selects
one node (respectively, Kn nodes) uniformly at random from all
other nodes; see Figure 1. The heterogeneous pairwise key predis-
tribution scheme induces an inhomogeneous random K-out graph,
denoted H(n; µ,Kn ). So far, very little is known, concerning afore-
mentioned design questions, about the heterogeneous pairwise
scheme and the induced random graph H(n; µ,Kn ). The analysis of
its 1-connectivity given in [10] yielded the surprising result that
lim
n→∞P [H(n; µ,Kn ) is connected] =
{
1 if Kn →∞,
< 1 otherwise.
(1)
This paper complements (1) through a comprehensive set of
results concerning the strength of connectivity in inhomogeneous
K-out graphs. First, we focus on k-connectivity of WSNs under the
heterogeneous pairwise scheme to understand how its parameters
n, µ,Kn should be selected such that the network is reliable in the
sense that it will remain connected even if any k − 1 nodes or edges
are removed. The notion of k-connectivity used in this paper coin-
cides with k-vertex connectivity, which is defined as the property
that the graph remains connected after deletion of any k − 1 ver-
tices. It is known that a k-vertex connected graph is always k-edge
connected, meaning that it will remain connected despite the re-
moval of any k − 1 edges [13],[6, p. 11]. Thus, we say that a graph is
k-connected (without explicitly referring to vertex-connectivity) to
refer to the fact that it will remain connected despite the deletion of
any k −1 vertices or edges. By Menger’s Theorem [6, p. 50 Theorem
3.3.1] it is known that if a network is k-connected, then there exists
at least k disjoint paths between all pairs of nodes.
In the context of WSNs, the property of k-connectivity is highly
desirable since it provides higher degree of fault tolerance and infor-
mation accuracy in aggregating information from multiple sensors
[21]. Reliability against the failure of sensors or links is particularly
critical in applications where the risk of adversarial capture is high,
e.g., in battlefield surveillance and applications in which the sen-
sors maybe left unattended for long time [47, 48]. Reliability is also
important in life-critical applications such as health monitoring.
Finally, a k-connected WSN can at any given time support up to
k − 1 mobile nodes without disrupting connectivity [48].
Although it is desirable to have ak-connected network, in several
practical applications, resource constraints can potentially limit the
number of links that can be successfully established. For instance,
if the power available for transmission is limited, the underlying
physical network may not be dense enough to guarantee global
connectivity with key predistribution schemes [17]. Furthermore, it
was reported [17] that maintaining a low node degree, e.g, between
5 and 8 can improve the network capacity. Depending on the nature
of the application, it may suffice to have a large connected sub-
network spanning almost the entire network [23]. For example, if a
sensor network is designed to monitor temperature of a field, then
instead of knowing the temperature at every location in the field,
it may suffice to have readings from a majority of sensors in the
field [21].
With these in mind, the second focus of this paper is on char-
acterizing the strength of connectivity of a WSN secured by the
heterogeneous pairwise scheme in scenarios where resource limi-
tations restrict the feasible values for parameter Kn . As seen in (1),
ensuring 1-connectivity of the resulting random graph H(n; µ,Kn )
requiresKn = ω(1). IfKn is finite, there is a positive probability that
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the network is disconnected. The next question which we address is
when Kn is constrained to be finite, how many nodes are contained
in the largest connected sub-network of H(n; µ,Kn )?
In view of its distinctive connectivity properties and simplicity of
construction, we envision the random K-out graph as a promising
model for many real-world networks in addition to WSNs. A recent
work proposed a structure similar to the random K-out graph to en-
able diffusion by proxy therebymaking the cryptocurrency network
robust to de-anonymization attacks [15, Algorithm 1]. The property
ofk-connectivity ensures the existence of at leastk mutually disjoint
paths between every pair of nodes. Given their sparse yet connected
structure, inhomogeneous random K-out graphs can be useful for
modeling bidirectional payment channel networks used for scaling
cryptocurrency networks [26]. Successful fulfilment of transactions
on payment channel networks is contingent on the identification
and availability of a path with sufficient funds between senders and
receivers. However, in general, users may split their transactions
across multiple disjoint paths to the recipients; see [29] and the ref-
erences therein. We postulate that in these additional applications
as well, it would be of interest to study k-connectivity property and
to understand the impact of heterogeneity.
1.1 Main Contributions
Our contributions in the realm of designing secure WSNs using
random pairwise schemes are two-fold:
1. A zero-one law for k-connectivity: The heterogeneous ran-
dom pairwise key distribution schemes induces an inhomo-
geneous random K-out graph characterized by the parame-
ters: (a) the probability distribution on node types (µ, 1 − µ)
and (b) the number of selections made by nodes (1,Kn ). We
derive scaling conditions on µ,Kn such that the inhomoge-
neous random K-out graph is k-connected asymptotically al-
most surely as n gets large, where k = 2, 3, . . . . We present
our result in terms of a sharp zero-one law. For any k ≥ 2,
we show that if Kn = 11−µ (logn + (k − 2) log logn + ω(1)),
then H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.). In contrast, if Kn = 11−µ (logn + (k − 2) log logn −ω(1)),
then H(n; µ,Kn ) is a.a.s. not k-connected. This result shows
that if there is a positive fraction of type-1 nodes, then type-2
nodes must make Kn = Ω(logn) selections for the network
to achieve k-connectivity for any k = 2, 3, . . .. This is rather
unexpected given that the network is a.a.s. 1-connected un-
der any Kn = ω(1). The result is also in contrast with most
other random graph models where the zero-one law for k-
connectivity appears in a form that reduces to a zero-one law
for 1-connectivity by simply setting k = 1. Through simulations
we study the impact of the parameters (µ,Kn ) on the probabil-
ity of k-connectivity when the number of nodes is finite and
observe a strong agreement with our asymptotic results.
2. Size of the largest connected component: For sensor net-
works operating in resource-constrained environments, it may
not be feasible to establish a large number of links. In such sce-
narios, if the resulting network is disconnected, it is desirable
to have a connected sub-network containing as many nodes as
possible. Our second main result characterizes the size of the
largest connected component of networks secured by the het-
erogeneous pairwise scheme. We show that if Kn ≥ 3 for all n,
then for all 0 < µ < 1, the largest connected component of the
resulting inhomogeneous random K-out graph is of size n−O(1)
whp, i.e., all but finitely many nodes are contained in the largest
connected component. Through experiments, we demonstrate
the usefulness of our result in the finite node regime. For in-
stance, with n = 5000, µ = 0.9,Kn = 3, at most 21 nodes turned
out to be outside the largest connected component across 15,000
experiments; see Section 3 for details.
Our results reveal the surprising insight that although it takes an
unexpectedly large increase in parameter Kn (from Kn = ω(1) to
Kn = Ω(logn)) to go from 1-connectivity to k-connectivity, k ≥ 2,
setting merely Kn = 3 is enough to ensure whp that all but finitely
many nodes are contained in the largest connected component.
1.2 Notation
All limits are understood with the number of nodes n going to
infinity. While comparing asymptotic behavior of a pair of se-
quences {an }, {bn }, we use an = o(bn ), an = ω(bn ), an = O(bn ),
an = Θ(bn ), and an = Ω(bn ) with their meaning in the standard
Landau notation. All random variables are defined on the same
probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements are made with
respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the correspond-
ing expectation operator by E. For an event A, its complement is
denoted by Ac. We let 1[A] denote the indicator random variable
which takes the value 1 if event A occurs and 0 otherwise. We say
that an event occurs with high probability (whp) or asymptotically
almost surely (a.a.s.) if it holds with probability tending to one as
n →∞. We denote the cardinality of any discrete set A by |A| and
the set of all positive integers by N0. For events A and B we let
A =⇒ B denote that A ⊆ B.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
Heterogeneous randompairwise keypredistribution scheme.
In order to facilitate heterogenous network designs, [10] extended
the pairwise scheme of Chan et al. [5] for enabling incorporation
of sensor nodes differing in their resources and requirements. The
heterogeneous random pairwise key predistribution scheme is im-
plemented as follows. Consider a network comprising of n nodes
indexed by labels i = 1, 2, . . .n with unique IDs: Id1, . . . , Idn . Each
node is assigned as type-1 (respectively, type-2) with probabil-
ity µ (respectively, 1 − µ) independently from other nodes where
0 < µ < 1. In the (offline) initialization phase, each type-1 (respec-
tively, type-2) node selects K1 (respectively, K2) distinct nodes cho-
sen uniformly at random as their neighbors. Let N := {1, 2, . . . ,n}
denote the set of node labels and N−i := {1, 2, . . . ,n} \ i . For each
i ∈ N , let Γn,i ⊆ N−i denote the labels corresponding to the se-
lections made by node vi from N−i uniformly at random. Observe
that for any subset of vertices A ⊆ N−i , it holds that
P[Γn,i = A | ti = ℓ] =
{ (n−1
Kℓ
)−1 if |A| = Kℓ ,
0 otherwise.
We further assume that Γn,1, . . . , Γn,n are mutually independent
given the types of nodes. Once the offline pairing process is com-
plete, we insert key rings Σn,1, . . . , Σn,n in the memory modules as
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follows. If i ∈ Γn, j ∨ j ∈ Γn,i , i.e., either node vi selects node vj or
node vj selects node vi or both, we generate a unique pairwise key
ωi j and inject this key and the corresponding node IDs in the mem-
ory modules of both nodes vi and vj . It is important to note that
the key ωi j is assigned exclusively to nodes vi and vj to be used in
securing the communication between them. In the post-deployment
key-setup phase, nodes first broadcast their IDs to their neighbors
following which each node searches for the corresponding IDs in
their key rings. Finally, node pairs wishing to communicate ver-
ify each others’ identities through a cryptographic handshake [5].
The strategy of assigning unique keys to nodes which were paired
during the offline node-pairing process is precisely the reason why
this technique is known as the pairwise key predistribution scheme.
The deployment of unique, pairwise keys brings several advantages
including resilience to node capture and node replication attacks
[5]. In the rest of this paper, we assume K1 = 1 and K2 ≥ 2 as in
[10] for simplicity. The more general cases with arbitrary number
of node types and arbitrary scheme parameters K1,K2, . . . need to
be studied separately. We assume that 0 < µ < 1 is fixed and K2
scales with n. From here onward, let Kn denote the scaling of K2
with n. Note that this is unlike the homogeneous pairwise scheme
[5] where all nodes choose exactly K neighbors.
Inhomogeneous RandomK-out graph. Under the full-visibility
assumption, i.e., when one-hop secure communication between a
pair of sensors hinges solely on them having a common key, a WSN
comprising of n sensors secured by the heterogeneous pairwise
key predistribution scheme can be modeled by an inhomogeneous
random K-out graph defined as follows. We say that two distinct
nodes vi and vj are adjacent, denoted by vi ∼ vj if they have at
least one common key in their respective key rings.
For the pairwise scheme, a unique pairwise key is generated per
selection and thus nodes vi and vj are adjacent, written vi ∼ vj , if
either node picks the other or both; i.e.,
vi ∼ vj if j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn, j . (2)
Thus, the adjacency condition (2) gives a precise construction of
edges on the vertex set {v1, . . . ,vn }. We denote the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph constructed using adjacency condition (2) as
H(n; µ,Kn ). Our notation explicitly reflects the dependence of the
induced random graph on the scheme parameters µ and Kn . Lastly,
noting that with probability µ (resp., 1 − µ), a node is labeled as
type-1 (resp., type-2) and selects 1 (resp.,Kn ) neighbors, the average
number of selections per node denoted by ⟨Kn⟩ is given by
⟨Kn⟩ = µ + (1 − µ)Kn . (3)
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present our main technical results: a zero-one law
for k-connectivity of inhomogeneous random K-out graphs induced
by the pairwise key predistribution scheme. Next, for scenarios in
which the choices made by type-2 nodes are constrained to be
finite, we show that all but finitely many nodes are contained in
the largest connected component of the resulting network. We
discuss the implications of these results and draw a comparison
with other widely studied random graph models. Finally, through
simulation experiments we demonstrate the usefulness of our result
in ascertaining network parameters for achieving a desired strength
of connectivity.
3.1 Main results
We refer to any mapping K : N0 → N0 satisfying the conditions
2 ≤ Kn < n, n = 2, 3, . . . , (4)
as a scaling.
Recall that we say that a graph is k-connected to refer to the
fact that it will remain connected despite the deletion of any k − 1
vertices or edges.
Next, we present our first main result that characterizes the
critical scaling of the scheme parameters (µ,Kn ) under which the
random graph H(n; µ,Kn ) induced by the pairwise scheme is k-
connected asymptotically almost surely.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 and µ such that
0 < µ < 1. With ⟨Kn⟩ = µ + (1 − µ)Kn and an integer k ≥ 2 let the
sequence γ : N0 → R be defined through
⟨Kn⟩ = logn + (k − 2) log logn + γn , (5)
for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Then, we have
lim
n→∞P
[
H(n; µ,Kn ) is
k-connected
]
=

1 if lim
n→∞γn = +∞,
0 if lim
n→∞γn = −∞.
(6)
Note that equation (5) presents a definition of the sequence
γn without any loss of generality and does not an impose any
assumption on the parameters (µ, Kn ). The scaling condition (5)
could be expressed directly in terms of Kn as
Kn =
logn + (k − 2) log logn
1 − µ + γn (7)
with the corresponding zero-one law (6) unchanged.
Theorem 3.1 provides a sharp zero-one law for thek-connectivity
of the random graph H(n; µ,Kn ) as the size of the network grows
large. Put differently, it establishes critical scaling conditions on
the parameters of the pairwise scheme (µ,Kn ) under which the
resulting WSN will be securely and reliably connected whp. We
see from [30, Theorem 1] that the critical scaling conditions for
k-connectivity coincide with those for the minimum node degree
to be at least k . This is similar to the case with most random graph
models including Erdős-Rényi (ER) graphs [13], random key graphs
[48] and random geometric graphs [24].
It follows from Theorem 3.1 that if there is a positive fraction
µ of type-1 nodes, then type-2 nodes must make Kn = Ω(logn)
selections for the network to achieve k-connectivity for any k =
2, 3, . . .. As discussed in Section 3.2, this result is rather unexpected
given that the network is a.a.s. 1-connected under anyKn = ω(1) as
shown in [9]. This gap between 1-connectivity and k-connectivity
for k ≥ 2 is in contrast with most other random graph models
where the zero-one law for k-connectivity appears in a form that
reduces to a zero-one law for 1-connectivity by simply setting k = 1;
see more in Section 3.2.
With Kn = ω(1) being needed for 1-connectivity [9], and Kn =
Ω(logn) being needed for k-connectivity for any k ≥ 2 (Theorem
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3.1), a natural question arises as to what the network would look
like when Kn is finite. For example, do we at least have a con-
nected sub-network containing a large number of nodes, or does
the network consist merely of small. To answer these questions,
we formally define connected components and then state our sec-
ond main result characterizing the size of the largest connected
component of H(n; µ,Kn ).
Definition 3.2 (Connected Components). Nodes v1 and v2 ∈ N
are said to be connected if there exists a path of edges connecting
them. The connectivity of a pair of nodes forms an equivalence
relation on the set of nodes. Consequently, there is a partition of
the set of nodes N into non-empty sets C1,C2, . . . ,Cm such that
two vertices v1 and v2 are connected if and only if ∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
for which v1,v2 ∈ Ci ; see [4, p. 13].
In light of the above definition, we say that a graph is connected
if it consists of only one connected component. In all other cases, the
graph is disconnected and has at least two connected components
that have no edges in between. It is often of interest to analyze the
fraction of the nodes contained in the network as the number of
nodes becomes infinite. In particular, a graph on with n nodes is
said to have a giant component if its largest connected component
is of size Ω(n)whp. The next result establishes the size of the largest
connected component ofH(n; µ,Kn ), denoted byCmax(n; µ,Kn ), for
any scaling satisfying Kn ≥ 3 for all n = 2, 3, . . ..
Theorem 3.3 (Largest Connected Component). For any µ
such that 0 < µ < 1 and any scaling Kn : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ≥ 3 for all n, we have
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = n − O(1) whp. (8)
To avoid confusion, we restate (8) more precisely as the fact that
if Kn ≥ 3 for all n, then for any ε > 0, there exists M(ε) and n(ε)
such that
P [n − |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| > M(ε)] < ε, ∀n ≥ n(ε).
This last fact is sometimes stated more compactly using the proba-
bilistic version of the big-O notation, Op , [18]. That is, (8) is equiv-
alent to stating that
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = n −Op (1). (9)
Theorem 3.3 reveals the surprising result that although it requires
Kn = ω(1) for H(n; µ,Kn ) to be connected a.a.s. (and Kn = Ω(logn)
for it to be 2-connected), Kn = 3 is sufficient to have a connected
sub-network containing, whp, all but finitely many of the nodes.
It is worth emphasizing that the largest connected component
of H(n; µ,Kn ), whose size is given at (8) or (9), is much larger than
what is strictly required to qualify it as a giant component; i.e., that
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = Ω(n). In fact, for most random graph models,
including Erdős-Rényi Graphs [12], random key graphs [27, The-
orem 2], studies on the size of the largest connected component
are focused on characterizing the behavior of Cmax/n as n gets
large; this amounts to studying the fractional size of the largest
connected component. Our result given as (9) goes beyond looking
at the fractional size of the largest component, for which it gives
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )|
n
→p 1, i.e., that |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = n − o(n) whp.
However, even having |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = n − o(n) leaves the pos-
sibility that as many as n0.99 nodes are not part of the largest con-
nected component. Thus, our result, showing that at most O(1)
nodes are outside the largest connected component whp, is sharper
than existing results on the fractional size of the largest connected
component. This discussion is continued in Section 3.2 where we
compare the size of the largest component of H(n; µ,Kn ) with that
of ER graphs when their mean degrees are the same.
Due to space limit, we present several steps of the proof of
Theorem 3.1 in Sections 4 and 5, with the rest given in the Appendix.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is also presented in the Appendix.
3.2 Discussion
We discuss some of the implications of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 on
the strength of connectivity of WSNs under the heterogeneous
pairwise key predistribution scheme. In particular, our results will
be compared against those obtained for other key predistribution
schemes including the homogeneous pairwise scheme.
WithEi j denoting the event that there exists an edge inH(n; µ,Kn )
between nodes vi and vj , we have
P[Ei j ] = 1 − (1 − P[i ∈ Γn, j ])(1 − P[j ∈ Γn,i ]),
= 1 −
(
1 − ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1
)2
=
2⟨Kn⟩
n − 1 −
( ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1
)2
. (10)
Therefore, if ⟨Kn⟩ = o(n), then the mean node degree inH(n; µ,Kn )
is 2⟨Kn⟩(1+o(1)), while the mean degree of type-1 nodes is 1+ ⟨Kn⟩.
Table 1 presents a comparison of the mean node degree needed for
having 1-connectivity and k-connectivity a.a.s. for homogeneous
and inhomogeneous random K-out graphs [10, 16], and random key
graphs induced by the Eschenauer and Gligor scheme [11, 14, 37, 38].
For inhomogeneous models, the table entries correspond to the
mean degree of the least connected node type. We also included the
corresponding results for ER graphs [13] for comparison.
An interesting observation is that for the inhomogeneous K-out
graph, increasing the strength of connectivity from 1 to k ≥ 2 re-
quires an increase of logn+(k−2) log logn in the mean degree. This
is much larger than what is required (i.e., (k − 1) log logn) in the
other models seen in Table 1. In fact, for most random graph models,
the zero-one law for 1 connectivity can be obtained from the corre-
sponding result for k-connectivity by setting k = 1; this can be con-
firmed from the entries in Table 1 for homogeneous/inhomogeneous
random key graphs and ER graphs. To the best of our knowledge,
inhomogeneous K-out graphs is the only model where the critical
scalings for 1-connectivity and 2-connectivity differ significantly.
From the perspective of key predistribution schemes, we see that
the homogeneous pairwise key predistribution scheme incurs the
least overhead in terms of the edges and keys required to achieve
1-connectivity and k-connectivity. Theorem 3.1, together with the
results in [9], show that the efficiency of the pairwise scheme in
achieving reliable connectivity reduces when sensors involved are
heterogeneous and the application requires setting K1 = 1; i.e.,
that a positive fraction of nodes picks just one other node to be
paired with. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the heterogeneous
pairwise scheme requires slightly smaller mean degree and number
of keys per node than inhomogeneous random key graphs.
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Table 1: A comparison of mean node degree needed for 1-connectivity and k-connectivity for different random graph models.
For inhomogeneous models, the values given in the table correspond to the mean degree for the least connected node type.
Random graph model Mean node degree for 1-connectivity Mean node degree for k -connectivity, k ≥ 2
Homogeneous K-out 4 2k
Inhomogeneous K-out ω(1) logn + (k − 2) log logn + ω(1)
Homogeneous random key logn + ω(1) logn + (k − 1) log logn + ω(1)
Inhomogeneous random key logn + ω(1) logn + (k − 1) log logn + ω(1)
Erdős-Rényi (ER) logn + ω(1) logn + (k − 1) log logn + ω(1)
Theorem 3.3 shows that the heterogeneous pairwise scheme
can still be useful even if Kn is constrained by the availability of
resources and establishing additional links is not be feasible. In par-
ticular, with onlyKn = 3, the heterogeneous pairwise scheme yields
a WSN in which the largest connected component spans n − O(1)
nodes whp. We expect that especially in resource-constrained en-
vironments (e.g., IoT type settings), it will be particularly advanta-
geous to have a relatively sparse network with a large connected
component.
Next, we compare the size of the largest component ofH(n; µ,Kn )
with an Erdős-Rényi graph on n nodes with the same mean node
degree. Let G(n;pn ) denote the ER graph on n nodes and link prob-
ability pn ∈ [0, 1]. It is known [12],[19, p. 109, Theorem 5.4] that
with p = c/n and c > 1 the graph has a giant component of size
βn(1+ o(1)) whp where β ∈ (0, 1] is the solution of β + e−βc = 1; if
c < 1, then whp the largest connected component is of sizeO(logn).
With p = c/n, the mean node degree in ER graphs equals c .
To provide an example comparison of the size of the giant com-
ponent inH(n; µ,Kn ) and ER graphs, let Kn = 3 and µ = 0.9. In that
case, themean degree inH(n; µ,Kn ) equals 2⟨Kn⟩ = 2(0.9+0.1×3) =
2.4. An ER graph with p = 2.4/n would have the same mean degree
and from the above discussion its largest connected component
would be of size ≈ 0.876n + o(n) whp. For a network of 5000 nodes,
this corresponds to over 600 nodes being isolated from the largest
component. In contrast, Theorem 3.3 suggests that the largest con-
nected component ofH(n; µ,Kn )with the same mean degree would
be much larger; namely it will be of size n − O(1) whp. This is
verified in our numerical experiments in Section 3.3 (see Figure 3),
where it is seen that for a network of 5000 nodes, at most 21 nodes
are seen to be disconnected from the largest connected component
of H(n; µ,Kn ) over 15,000 experiments.
3.3 Simulations
Here, we provide empirical studies investigating the impact of
network parameters on the strength of connectivity of H(n; µ,Kn ).
Impact of network parameters on k-connectivity.We first
present simulation results to show the impact of the number of
choices made by type-2 nodes (Kn ) and the probability of a node
being assigned type-1 (µ) on the probability of k-connectivity. We
consider a network ofn = 1000 nodes secured by the heterogeneous
pairwise scheme with parameters µ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 and varying Kn .
For each parameter tuple (n, µ,Kn ,k), 1000 independent realiza-
tions for H(n; µ,Kn ) are generated and empirical probability of
k-connectivity is plotted in Figure (2) as the fraction of realizations
(out of 1000) for which H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected.
A smaller value of µ corresponds to a network dominated by type-
2 nodes. Consequently, for a low µ regime, the resulting graph is
more dense and we expect to see stronger connectivity. Conversely,
when µ is large, it takes a higher value for the parameter Kn to
achieve the same strength of connectivity. This trend is reflected in
Figure 2 wherein the minimum Kn required to make the network k-
connected whp increases as µ increases. We point out that the scale
of the plots for different µ has been chosen differently for compactly
reporting roughly the same number of values of Kn on either side
of the phase transition. Whenever, a network is k-connected, it
automatically implies that the network is ℓ-connected for all ℓ < k .
This manifests as the upward shift in the probability of connectivity
as k decreases in Figure 2.
The vertical dashed lines show critical thresholds of Kn values
indicated by Theorem 3.1 and scaling condition (7); namely
Kn =
⌈
logn + (k − 2) log logn
1 − µ
⌉
. (11)
It is evident that the probability of k-connectivity increases sharply
from 0 to 1 within a small neighborhood of Kn defined in (11). The
last plot in Figure 2 shows the largest value of k for which the
network is connected in 990 out of 1000 realizations for a given µ
and Kn. We see that to achieve a desired level of connectivity, a
network designer can trade-off a smaller Kn for a larger value of
1 − µ and vice versa. For instance, if the goal is to design a secure
network of 1000 nodes which is 3-connected with probability 0.99,
from Figure 2 we can see that the network designer can set the
parameters (Kn , µ) as (15, 0.1), (20, 0.3) or (30, 0.5) respectively.
Size of the largest connected component. Next, we investi-
gate the size of the largest connected component of H(n; µ,Kn ).
Recall from Theorem 3.3 that for Kn ≥ 3 the largest connected com-
ponent is of size n − O(1) whp; i.e, all but finitely many nodes are
in the largest connected component. We present empirical studies
probing the applicability of this result in the non-asymptotic regime.
We generated 15,000 independent realizations of H(n; µ,Kn ) with
Kn = 3 for n = 1000 and n = 5000, varying µ between 0.1 and 0.9.
Since Theorem 3.3 gives a lower bound on the size of the largest con-
nected component, we focus on the minimum observed size across
15,000 experiments. The average size of the largest component is
also shown for comparison. Results are depicted in Figure 3.
We observe that as µ increases, both the average and the mini-
mum size of the largest connected component decrease monotoni-
cally. More interestingly, we see that even when the probability of
a node being type-1 is as high as 0.9, setting Kn = 3 is enough to
have almost all of the nodes to form a connected component. For
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Figure 2: Empirical probability of k-connectivity of H(n; µ,Kn ) averaged over 1, 000 experiments is shown when n = 1000, vary-
ing Kn and three different µ values; Kn is the number of choices made by type-2 nodes and µ is the fraction of type-1 nodes.
The vertical dashed lines in indicate the threshold Kn =
⌈
logn+(k−2) log logn
1−µ
⌉
corresponding to the scaling condition (7) in The-
orem 3.1. The last plot shows the maximum value of k such that H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected with probability (w.p.) at least 0.99;
i.e., the largest k for which the network is k-connected in at least 990 of the 1000 experiments.
n = 1000 and 5000, only 29 and 21 nodes, respectively, are not con-
tained in the largest connected component. The observation that
the number of nodes outside the largest connected component does
not scale with n is consistent with Theorem 3.3 which states that
there are onlyO(1) nodes outside the largest connected component.
4 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
In this section, we outline the high-level steps of the proof of The-
orem 3.1 and present results that reduce the proof to establishing
Proposition 4.3 given at the end of this section. The proof of Propo-
sition 4.3 starts in Section 5 with key observations and proofs of
necessary technical Lemmas, and is completed in the Appendix due
to space limitations.
The heterogeneity of node types makes H(n; µ,Kn ) a compli-
cated model and the proofs involve techniques that are different
from those used for the homogenous K-out random graph [16], [40].
For instance, certain correlations that are known to exist amongst
events of interest in homogeneous K-out graphs do not necessarily
hold in H(n; µ,Kn ). The simplest example is the events that encode
the existence of an edge between nodes vx and vy (Exy) and vx
and vz (Exz). These are known to be negatively correlated in the
homogeneous K-out graph [39]. However, in H(n; µ,Kn ), if we con-
dition on Exy, two competing factors come into play. Under Exy
it becomes more likely that vx is type-2 meaning that it is now
more likely to be connected to vz . However, Exy also means that
either vy picked vx or vx picked vy . The latter event means that
vx already used one of its choices and thus became less likely to
be connected to another node vz . Due to these difficulties, some of
the key bounds used in our proof are obtained via conditioning on
the types of nodes.
4.1 Proving the zero-law: From minimum node
degree to k-connectivity
Consider an inhomogeneous random K-out graph H(n; µ,Kn ) as
given in the statement of Theorem 3.1 with the sequence γ : N0 →
R defined through (7) for k ≥ 2. Let δ denote the minimum node
degree in H(n; µ,Kn ), i.e., δ := mini=1, ...,n {deg(vi )}, with deg(vi )
denoting the number of edges incident on vertex vi . A zero-one
law for the minimum node degree of H(n; µ,Kn ) was established
in [30, Theorem 1]. Namely, it was shown for all k = 2, 3, . . . that
lim
n→∞P [δ ≥ k ] =

1 if lim
n→∞γn = +∞,
0 if lim
n→∞γn = −∞.
(12)
Let κv denote the minimum number of vertices that need to be
removed from H(n; µ,Kn ) to make it not connected. As before, we
say that H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected if κv ≥ k . We always have
κv ≤ δ (13)
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Figure 3: Average number of nodes andminimumnumber of nodes contained in the largest connected component of H(n; µ,Kn )
across 15, 000 experiments withKn = 3, n = 1000, 5000 and µ ∈ {0.1, . . . , 0.9}. We see that when 90% of the nodes are type-1, setting
K = 3 is enough to have almost all of the nodes to form a connected component; at most 21 out of 5000 nodes (or, 29 out of
1000 nodes) are seen to be isolated from the giant component over 15,000 experiments.
since removing all neighbors of a node with degree δ would render
the node isolated, making the graph disconnected. Thus, for all
k = 1, 2, . . ., it holds that [κv ≥ k] ⊆ [δ ≥ k], which gives
P[κv ≥ k] ≤ P[δ ≥ k]. (14)
In view (14), the zero-law given in (12) leads to
lim
n→∞P [H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected] = 0 if limn→∞γn = −∞ (15)
establishing the zero-law of Theorem 3.1.
4.2 A sufficient condition for the one-law for
k-connectivity
The rest of this section is devoted to proving the one-law of Theo-
rem 3.1, namely showing that
lim
n→∞P [H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected] = 1 if limn→∞γn = +∞ (16)
From (12) we see that P[δ ≥ k] → 1 when γn → +∞. To leverage
this result, we write
P[κv ≥ k] = P[κv ≥ k, δ ≥ k] (17)
= P[δ ≥ k] − P[δ ≥ k,κv < k],
= P[δ ≥ k] − P
[
∪k−1ℓ=0 {δ ≥ k,κv = ℓ}
]
≥ P[δ ≥ k] − P
[
∪k−1ℓ=0 {δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ}
]
= P[δ ≥ k] −
k−1∑
ℓ=0
P [δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ] (18)
where (17) is a consequence of (13). Using the one-law of (12) in (18),
we see that the one-law for k-connectivity (i.e., (16)) will follow if
we establish that
lim
n→∞P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ] = 0 if limn→∞γn = +∞, ∀ ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,k − 1.
(19)
Conditions in (19) encode the improbability for H(n; µ,Kn ) to
have minimum node degree of at least ℓ+1 and yet be disconnected
by deletion of a set of ℓ nodes. In the subsequent sections, we
establish (19) by deriving a tight upper bound on P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ]
which goes to zero as n gets large for each ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,k − 1. This
approach has also proved useful in establishing one-laws for k-
connectivity in many other random graph models including Erdős
Rényi (ER) graphs [3, p. 164], random key graphs, intersection of
ER graphs and homogeneous K-out graphs [43], etc.
4.3 A reduction step
In this section we show that while proving the sufficient condition
(19) for k-connectivity, we can restrict our analysis to the subclass
of sequences γn defined through (7) that scale as O(logn). As the
next result shows, the desired one-law for k-connectivity (without
any constraint on γn ) would follow upon establishing it for the
constrained scaling.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 and µ such that
0 < µ < 1. With an integer k ≥ 2 let the sequence γn be defined
through (7).
If it holds that
lim
n→∞γn = +∞ and γn = O(logn)
=⇒ lim
n→∞P[H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected ] = 1
then the following implication also holds
lim
n→∞γn = +∞ =⇒ limn→∞P[H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected ] = 1.
Lemma 4.1 states that we can assume the conditionγn = O(logn)
in proving the one-law for k-connectivity in Theorem 3.1 without
any loss of generality. Its proof passes through showing that for
any scaling K : N0 → N0 satisfying γn → +∞, we can construct
an auxiliary scaling K˜ : N0 → N0 such that i) the corresponding
sequence γ˜n satisfies both γ˜n → +∞ and γ˜n = O(logn); and ii)
K˜n ≤ Kn for all n = 2, 3, . . .. In view of the second fact, we then
provide a formal coupling argument showing that
P[H(n; µ, K˜n ) is k-connected ] ≤ P[H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected ].
A proof of Lemma 4.1 with all details is given in Appendix A.
We find it convenient to introduce the notion of admissible scal-
ing to characterize mappings that satisfy the additional condition
γn = O(logn).
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Definition 4.2 (Admissible Scaling). A mapping K : N0 → N0 is
said to be an admissible scaling if (4) holds and the sequence γn
defined through (7) satisfies γn = O(logn).
It is now clear that the proof of Theorem 3.1 will be completed if
we establish (19) for any admissible scaling. This result is presented
separately for convenience as follows.
Proposition 4.3. With 0 < µ < 1 and an integer k ≥ 2, consider
an admissible scaling K : N0 → N0 with the sequence γn defined
through (7). We have
lim
n→∞P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ] = 0 if limn→∞γn = +∞, ∀ ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,k − 1.
The main benefit of being able to restrict the discussion to ad-
missible scalings is to have Kn = Θ(logn)when γn →∞ in view of
(7). This condition will prove useful in bounding P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ]
efficiently in several places.
5 A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3
In this section, we present several steps to obtain an upper bound
on P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ]. The proof of Proposition 4.3 is completed in
Appendix C as we show that the obtained upper bound approaches
zero as n gets large.
5.1 Towards an upper bound on P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ]
Recall that H(n; µ,Kn ) denotes the inhomogeneous random K-out
graph on n nodes with N being the set of node labels {1, 2, . . . ,n}.
For any V ⊆ N , let I(n; µ,Kn )(V ) denote the induced sub-graph
obtained by restricting H(n; µ,Kn ) to the subset of nodes in V i.e.,
I(n; µ,Kn )(V ) is a graph with vertex set {vi : i ∈ V } and edge
set given by the subset of edges of H(n; µ,Kn ) which have both
endpoints in V . Put differently, I(n; µ,Kn )(V ) is the graph induced
from H(n; µ,Kn ) upon deletion of nodes in V c, where V ⊆ N and
V c = N \V .
We will establish an upper bound on P[κv = ℓ,δ > ℓ] where
0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k − 1 by considering events which follow under {δ >
ℓ,κv = ℓ}; i.e., that the graph H(n; µ,Kn ) has minimum degree
strictly greater than ℓ and yet it can be made disconnected by
deleting a set of ℓ nodes. If κv = ℓ, then by definition there exists
a vertex cut U ⊂ N containing ℓ nodes such that the deletion of
U disconnects H(n; µ,Kn ). More precisely, there must existU ⊂ N
with |U | = ℓ and T ⊂ U c such that H(n; µ,Kn ) is (U ,T )-separable;
i.e., deleting all nodes in U renders H(n; µ,Kn ) disconnected into
a subgraph on vertices T and a subgraph on vertices U c/T with
no edges in between the two subgraphs (see Figure 4). Without
any loss of generality, we let T denote the smaller of the sets T and
U c/T . Thus, we have |T | ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋.
We can further make the following observations regarding the
setsU , T , andU c/T under the event {κv = ℓ,δ > ℓ}:
(1) Consider an arbitrary node v ∈ T . Since there are no edges
between T and (U c)/T , all edges incident on v must have
their endpoints in the setU ∪T \ {v}. Further, since δ > ℓ,
there are at least ℓ + 1 edges from v toU ∪T \ {v}. Noting
that |U | = ℓ, there must be an edge with between v and
T \ {v} and thus |T | ≥ 2.
T
U
vr
v1 vl
CT DUT
BUT
. . .
UC \ T
vl +1 . . .
Figure 4: A necessary condition for the event [κv = ℓ, δ > ℓ]
to take place is the occurrence of the event AU,T defined as
the intersection of CT,DUT and BUT.
(2) For a given vertex cutU (whose deletion makes H(n; µ,Kn )
disconnected) there might be more than one set T ⊂ U c
for which H(n; µ,Kn ) is (U ,T )-separable. Thus, it suffices to
identify the smallest set T for which I(n; µ,Kn )(T ) is con-
nected. In other words, if κv = ℓ and δ > ℓ, then H(n; µ,Kn )
should be (U ,T )-separable for some U ⊂ N with |U | = ℓ
and T ⊂ U c with 2 ≤ |T | ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋ such that I(n; µ,Kn )(V )
is connected. Let CT denote the event that I(n; µ,Kn )(T ) is
connected.
(3) Each node inU must have a neighbor in T . Assume towards
a contradiction that there exists a node u in U which does
not have a neighbor in T . This means thatU \ {u} forms a
vertex cut of size ℓ − 1 in H(n; µ,Kn ) which contradicts the
fact that κv ≥ ℓ. Let BUT denote the event that each node
inU has a neighbor in T .
The above observations are depicted in Figure 4 and summarized
below. For H(n; µ,Kn ), If δ > ℓ and κv = ℓ then ∃U ,T ⊂ N such
that |U | = ℓ and 2 ≤ |T | ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋ and the following events occur.
1. CT: I(n; µ,Kn )(T ) is connected,
2. BUT: All nodes inU have a neighbor in the set T ,
3. DUT: T is isolated in I(n; µ,Kn )(U c); i.e., there are no edges
in H(n; µ,Kn ) between nodes in T and nodes inU c/T .
Let AU,T be defined as the intersection of these three events; i.e.,
AU,T := CT ∩ BUT ∩ DUT.
Let [Z]r denote the collection of subsets of set Z with exactly r
elements. From the preceding arguments, we see that the following
inclusion holds.
{δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ} ⊆ ∪U ∈[N]ℓ,T ⊂U c,2≤ |T | ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋AU,T.
Using a union bound, we get
P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ] ≤
∑
U ∈[N]ℓ,T ⊆U c,2≤ |T | ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋
P[AU,T],
=
⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋∑
r=2
∑
U ∈[N]ℓ,T ∈[U c]r
P[AU,T], (20)
For r = 1, . . . ,n − ℓ − 1, let A{1, ..., ℓ }, {ℓ+1, ..., ℓ+r } , C{ℓ+1, ..., ℓ+r } ,
B{1, ..., ℓ }, {ℓ+1, ..., ℓ+r } , and D{1, ..., ℓ }, {ℓ+1, ..., ℓ+r } be denoted by
Aℓ,r, Cℓ,r, Bℓ,r and Dℓ,r respectively. The number of subsets of
N of size ℓ is (nℓ ) and the number of subsets of N \U of size r is
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Table 2: Notation
Event Definition
B All nodes inU have a neighbor in the set T .
C I(n; µ,Kn )(T ) is connected.
DST None of the nodes in S pick nodes in T as their neighbors.
DTS None of the nodes in T pick nodes in S as their neighbors.
D T is isolated in I(n; µ,Kn )(U c), thus D = DST ∩ DTS.
Ei j Nodes vi and vj are adjacent, where i, j ∈ N .
Xt All nodes in T are type-t , where t = 1, 2.
(n−ℓ
r
)
. Under the enforced assumptions, the exchangeability of the
vertex labels yields
P[AU,T] = P[Aℓ,r], U ∈ [N]ℓ , T ∈ [U c]r (21)
Substituting (21) in (20), we thus get
P[δ > ℓ,κv = ℓ] ≤
⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[Aℓ,r]. (22)
Combining (19) and (22), we observe that to establish the one-law
for k-connectivity, it suffices to show that the following holds,
lim
n→∞
⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[Aℓ,r] = 0, ∀ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,k − 1. (23)
5.2 Observations regarding events Bℓ,r and Cℓ,r
Recall that Aℓ,r = Cℓ,r ∩ Bℓ,r ∩ Dℓ,r. What makes the proof of
Proposition 4.3 particularly challenging is the intricate correlations
among these events. In what follows, we establish several useful
bounds that will pave the way for proving Proposition 4.3. Define
S := U c \ T . For the remaining sections, we suppress the indices
(ℓ, r ) and work with the notation and definitions listed in Table 2.
In particular, we define DTS to be the event that for each i in T ,
the nodes Γi,n picked by vi should all belong to Sc . We define DST
similarly as the event that all j in S pick their choices Γj,n from
outside of T . For T to be isolated in I(n; µ,Kn )(U c), both DTS and
DST should hold, whence D = DST ∩ DTS. With t = 1, 2, we define
Xt as the event that all nodes in T are type t . Finally, Ei j denotes
the event that there exists an edge in H(n; µ,Kn ) between nodes vi
and vj ; i.e., Ei j = j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn, j .
A key observation towards bounding events B,C is the fact that
for any S ⊆ N , the random variables {1[Ei j ] : i, j ∈ S, i , j}
are negatively associated conditionally on the types of nodes in S .
Negative association of random variables, introduced by Joag-Dev
and Proschnan [20] is a stronger form of negative correlation, and
is formally defined next.
Definition 5.1 (Negative Association of RVs). The rvs {Xλ , λ ∈
Λ} are said to be negatively associated if for any non-overlapping
subsets A and B of Λ and for any monotone increasing mappings
φ : R |A | → R andψ : R |B | → R, the covariance inequality
E [φ(XA)ψ (XB )] ≤ E [φ(XA)]E [ψ (XB )] (24)
holds whenever the expectations in (24) are well defined and finite.
An important observation is that the negative association of the
rvs {Xλ , λ ∈ Λ} implies [20, P2, p. 288] the inequality
E
[∏
λ∈A
fλ(Xλ)
]
≤
∏
λ∈A
E [fλ(Xλ)] (25)
whereA is a subset of Λ and the collection { fλ , λ ∈ A} of mappings
R→ R+ are all monotone increasing.
It was shown in [39] that for the homogeneous random K-out
graph H(n;K), the edge assignment variables, {1[Ei j ] : i , j, i, j =
1, . . . ,n} are negatively associated. This follows from the fact that
{1 [j ∈ Γn,i ] , j ∈ N − {i}} (26)
form a collection of negatively associated rvs when the sets Γn,i
represent a random sample (without replacement) of size K from
N −{i}; see [20, Example 3.2(c)] for details. For the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph H(n; µ,Kn ), the situation is more intricate
since the size of the random samples Γn,i are themselves random
(takes the value one with probability µ and Kn with probability
1− µ). Nevertheless, if we condition on the types of nodes, then the
size of the samples Γn,i become fixed and negative association of
the collection of rvs in (26) would still follow. This overlaps with
the notion of conditional negative association introduced recently
in [45]. This observation is presented next.
Lemma 5.2. For the inhomogeneous randomK-out graphH(n; µ,Kn ),
let ®tS denote the vector of types for nodes in S ⊆ N . Then, the collec-
tion of random variables {1[Ei j ], i , j, i, j ∈ S} are conditionally
negatively associated given ®tS . Namely, we have that
E

∏
i,j,i, j ∈S
f (1[Ei j])
 ®tS  ≤
∏
i,j,i, j ∈S
E
[
f (1[Ei j ])
 ®tS ] (27)
for any monotone increasing function f .
Proof. The proof of Lemma 5.2 follows from the preceding
arguments and negative association of the random variables in (26)
when the size of the mappings 1[j ∈ Γn,i ] are fixed given ®tS . □
Next, we will make repeated use of the preceding observations
and Lemma 5.2 to obtain upper bounds on the events B,C .
Lemma 5.3. For r ∈ {2, . . . ,n − ℓ − 1}, we have
P[B | Xt ] ≤
(
rP[Ei j | vj is type-t]
)ℓ where t = 1, 2.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. The event B is characterized as
B =
ℓ⋂
i=1
ℓ+r⋃
j=ℓ+1
Ei j . (28)
Let ®tu ∈ {1, 2}ℓ be defined as the vector (of size ℓ) containing the
types of nodes inU ; v1, . . . ,vℓ ; i.e., for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, the type
of node vi is (®tu)i . Given Xt , ®tu, the types of all nodes associated
with the event B (i.e., v1, . . . ,vℓ+r ) are determined. Thus, using
Lemma 5.2 with S = {1, . . . , ℓ + r }, we see that the collection of
random variables {1[Ei j ], i , j, i, j = 1, . . . , ℓ + r } are condition-
ally negatively associated givenXt , ®tu. Furthermore, by the “disjoint
monotone aggregation" property of negative association [8, p. 35],
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the collection of rvs
{
1
[
∪ℓ+rj=ℓ+1Ei j
]
, i = 1, . . . , ℓ
}
are also con-
ditionally negatively associated given Xt , ®tu. Conditioning on ®tu,
we thus get
P[B | Xt ] = E[ 1[B] | Xt ]
= E
[
E
[
1[B]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ]
= E
[
E
[
ℓ∏
i=1
1
[
∪ℓ+rj=ℓ+1Ei j
]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ]
≤ E
[
ℓ∏
i=1
E
[
1
[
∪ℓ+rj=ℓ+1Ei j
]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ] (29)
≤ E
[
ℓ∏
i=1
E
[
ℓ+r∑
j=ℓ+1
1[Ei j ]
 Xt , ®tu]  Xt ] (30)
= E

ℓ∏
i=1
ℓ+r∑
j=ℓ+1
P
[
Ei j
 Xt , ®tu]  Xt 
= E
[
ℓ∏
i=1
r
(
1 −
(
1 − Kt
n − 1
) (
1 −
K(®tu)i
n − 1
))  Xt ] (31)
= r ℓE
[
ℓ∏
i=1
(
1 −
(
1 − Kt
n − 1
) (
1 −
K(®tu)i
n − 1
))]
(32)
= r ℓ
(
E
[(
1 −
(
1 − Kt
n − 1
) (
1 −
K(®tu)i
n − 1
))])ℓ
(33)
=
(
rP[Ei j | vj is type-t]
)ℓ
where (29) follows the conditional negative association of random
variables {1[Ei j ], i , j, i, j = 1, . . . , ℓ + r } given Xt , ®tu, (30) follows
from a union bound, (31) follows from the direct computation of
P[Ei j | Xt , ®tu] under given types (similar to (10)), (32) follows from
the independence of Xt and ®tu, and (33) is a consequence of the
independence of the random variables {(®tu)i , i = 1, . . . , ℓ}. □
The next result shows that conditioning on all nodes in T being
type-2 provides an upper bound on the events B,C .
Lemma 5.4. Given that all nodes inT are of type-2, the occurrence
of events B and C become more likely, i.e.,
P[B,C] ≤ P[B,C |X2].
Proof of Lemma 5.4.
P[B,C] = P[B,C | X2]P[X2] + P[B,C | Xc2 ]P[Xc2 ] (34)
Thus, it suffices to show that
P[B,C | Xc2 ] ≤ P[B,C | X2] (35)
To see this, we note that both events B andC are monotone increas-
ing under edge addition. In other words, if event B (resp. C) occurs
in a given realization H1 of H(n; µ,Kn ), then it will also occur in
any another realization H2 ⊇ H1. Given a graph in which T has
m (1 ≤ m ≤ r ) type-1 nodes, we can construct another graph by
selecting precisely Kn − 1 neighbors uniformly at random from
the remaining n − 2 nodes for each type-1 node. This construction
shows that the edge set of the realization of H(n; µ,Kn ) in which
there is at least one type-1 node in set T is strictly contained in the
corresponding edge set when all nodes in T are type-2. Thus, we
get (35) as a consequence of both events B and C being monotone-
increasing upon edge addition. □
Lemma 5.5. For r ∈ {2, . . . ,n − ℓ − 1}, we have
P[C | Xt ] ≤ r r−2P[Ei j | vi ,vj ∈ T are type-t]r−1.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. C is the event that nodes in T form a con-
nected subgraph in H(n; µ,Kn ), i.e., that I(n; µ,Kn )(T ) is connected.
This is equivalent to stating that H(n; µ,Kn ) contains a spanning
tree on nodes in T . Let QT denote the collection of all spanning
trees on the vertices in T . Put differently, each Q ∈ QT is a collec-
tion of r − 1 node pairs representing the r − 1 edges of the tree.
Hence, we have
C =
⋃
Q ∈QT
⋂
(j1, j2)∈Q
Ej1 j2 (36)
From Lemma 5.2, we know that the random variables {1[Ei j ], i ,
j, i, j ∈ T } are conditionally negatively associated given the types
of nodes in T . Also, by Cayley’s formula [4, p. 35], we know that
there are r r−2 trees on r vertices, i.e., |QT | = r r−2. Using a union
bound in (36), we then get
P[C | Xt ] ≤
∑
Q ∈QT
E

∏
(j1, j2)∈Q
1[Ej1 j2 ]
 Xt 
≤
∑
Q ∈QT
∏
(j1, j2)∈Q
P
[
Ej1 j2
 Xt ] (37)
= r r−2P[Ei j | vi ,vj ∈ T are type-t]r−1 (38)
where (37) follows from the conditional negative association of
{1[Ej1j2] : j1, j2 ∈ Q} given the types of all nodes in T ⊃ Q , and
(38) follows from exchangeability of events Ej1 j2 . □
Lemma 5.6. The events B and C are negatively correlated given
the types of nodes in T , i.e,
P[B,C |Xt ] ≤ P[B |Xt ]P[C |Xt ], t = 1, 2.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. From (36), we see that
1[C] = 1 −
∏
Q ∈QT
©­«1 −
∏
(j1, j2)∈Q
1[Ej1 j2 ]ª®¬ (39)
while from (28) we have
1 [B] =
ℓ∏
i=1
©­«1 −
ℓ+r∏
j=ℓ+1
(
1 − 1[Ei j ]
)ª®¬ . (40)
From Lemma 5.2, we know that the random variables {1[Ei j ], i ,
j, i, j = 1, . . . , ℓ + r } are conditionally negatively associated given
the types of all nodes v1, . . . ,vℓ+r . We will leverage this fact to
show the conditional negative association of rvs 1[B] and 1[C]
given Xt and ®tu , where ®tu denotes the vector containing types of
nodes v1, . . . ,vℓ . First, note that the node pairs (j1, j2) given in (39)
are all in the set T = {ℓ + 1, . . . , ℓ + r }. Thus, the 1[Ej1 j2 ] terms
that appear in (39) are disjoint from the 1[Ei j ] terms that appear
in (40). Second, the relations given in (39) and (40) constitute non-
decreasing mappings of the rvs 1[Ej1 j2 ] and 1[Ei j ], respectively.
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Thus, from the disjoint monotone aggregation property [8, p. 35]
of negative association, it follows that the rvs 1[B] and 1[C] are
conditionally negatively associated given Xt and ®tu (equivalently,
given the types of nodes v1, . . . ,vℓ+r ). Conditioning on ®tu , we get
P[ B,C |Xt ] = E
[
1 [B,C]  Xt ]
= E
[
E
[
1[B]1[C]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ]
≤ E
[
E
[
1[B]  Xt , ®tu] E [1[C]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ] (41)
= E
[
P
[
C
 Xt ] E [ 1[B]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ] (42)
= P [C | Xt ]E
[
E
[
1[B]  Xt , ®tu]  Xt ]
= P
[
C
 Xt ] P [B  Xt ]
where (41) follows from conditional negative association of 1[B]
and 1[C] given Xt and ®tu , and (42) follows from the fact that event
C is independent from ®tu . □
5.3 Upper bounds for P[Aℓ,r]
We have now obtained all the necessary bounds concerning the
events B and C to obtain upper bounds on Aℓ,r tight enough to
establish (23); as already discussed, establishing (23) in turn com-
pletes the proof of the one-law for k-connectivity. In what follows,
we will need to derive different upper bounds for Aℓ,r in different
ranges of r = 2, . . . , ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋ to be considered in the sum appearing
at (23). Recall thatAℓ,r = B ∩C ∩D = B ∩C ∩DTS ∩DST. Among
the events B,C,DTS and DST, the event DST depends exclusively
on the choices made by nodes in S while events C and DTS depend
exclusively on choices made by nodes in T . However, the event
B depends on choices made by nodes in T and U and is thus de-
pendent on the type of nodes in T and U with Lemmas 5.6 and
5.3 describing the correlations. Our strategy for deriving an upper
bound hinges on the selection of the subset of events which the
yield the tightest bounds as r varies. We partition the range of
indices in the summation in (23) as outlined below.
Range 1 (Small r ): When 2 ≤ r ≤ Kn − ℓ, for S and T to be
isolated, all nodes in T must be type-1, i.e., the occurrence of event
X1 is a necessary condition for the event Aℓ,r. If X1 did not occur,
then a type-2 node in T could pick at most r − 1 + ℓ ≤ Kn − 1
neighbors from among nodes in T ∪ U (distinct from itself). In
that case, it will be forced to select at least one neighbor from S
contradicting the event D (i.e., that there are no edges between T
and S). Noting that the probability of the event that all nodes in T
are type-1 is µr , we have
P[B,C,D] = µrP[B,C,D | X1]
≤ µrP[B,C,DST | X1] (43)
= µrP[B,C | X1]P[DST] (44)
≤ µrP[B | X1]P[C | X1]P[DST] (45)
where (43) follows from DST ⊆ D, (44) follows from independence
of DST and B,C,X1, and (45) follows from Lemma 5.6 with t = 1.
Range 2 (Intermediate r ):When Kn − ℓ + 1 ≤ r ≤ ⌊ nKn−1 ⌋, it
is no longer needed to have X1 for Aℓ,r to take place. We instead
condition on the increased likelihood of events B and C under the
condition that all nodes in T are of type-2 as follows.
P[B,C,D] ≤ P[B,C,DST],
= P[B,C]P[DST], (46)
≤ P[B,C | X2] P[DST], (47)
≤ P[B | X2] P[C | X2] P[DST], (48)
where (46) follows from the independence of DST and B,C , (47)
follows from Lemma 5.4, and (48) follows from Lemma 5.6.
Range 3 (Large r ): When ⌊ nKn−1 ⌋ + 1 ≤ r ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ2 ⌋, the num-
ber of nodes in T is significantly large and the bound obtained in
Lemma 5.5 is no longer tight. Moreover, with the large number
of nodes in T , the event B that all nodes in B have a neighbor in
T becomes highly likely. Therefore, in this case, we consider both
events DST and DTS to get a tight upper bound for B ∩C ∩ D.
P[B,C,D] ≤ P[D] = P[DST,DTS] = P[DST]P[DTS] (49)
since events DST and DTS are independent.
Based on the preceding discussion, we partition the summation
in (23) into three partial sums corresponding to Regimes 1,2 and 3
In particular, we have
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B,C,D] (50)
≤
Kn−ℓ∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
µrP[B | X1]P[C | X1]P[DST]
+
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X2]P[C | X2]P[DST]
+
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[DST]P[DTS].
The proof of (23) is completed in the Appendix with each of these
three partial sums are shown to approach zero as n → ∞; see
Sections C.1, C.2, C.3, respectively.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the strength of connectivity in wireless sensor
networks secured by the heterogeneous random pairwise scheme.
In particular, for the inhomogeneous random K-out graphs induced
under this scheme, we derive conditions on the scheme parame-
ters such that the resulting network is k-connected with proba-
bility approaching one (respectively, zero) constituting the one-
law (respectively, zero-law), as the number of nodes gets large
for k = 2, 3, . . . . In cases where the scheme parameter Kn is con-
strained to be small, we proved that whenever Kn ≥ 3, the largest
connected sub-network spans all but finitely many nodes of the
network with high probability. Our results are shown to provide sur-
prising insights into the design of heterogeneous sensor networks
under the pairwise scheme. An open direction is characterizing the
asymptotic size of the largest connected component of the inho-
mogeneous random K-out graph for Kn = 2. In fact, the size of the
largest connected component of the homogeneous K-out random
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graph when K = 1 is also not known to the best of our knowl-
edge. It would also be of great interest to analyze the properties
of inhomogeneous random K-out graphs with r > 2 node types
and arbitrary parameters K1,K2, . . . ,Kr associated with each node
type. Finally, it would be interesting to pursue further applications
of inhomogeneous K-out graphs in the context of cryptographic
payment channel networks.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
Consider any scaling Kn : N0 → N0 such that the corresponding
sequence γn defined through (7) satisfies limn→∞γn = ∞. The next
result shows that for any such scaling, an admissible scaling can be
constructed with the corresponding parameters satisfying a useful
bound.
Proposition A.1 (Existence of Admissible Scaling). Consider
a scaling Kn : N0 → N0 and a sequence γn : N0 → R defined
through (7) satisfying γn → +∞. Then, there exists an admissible
scaling K˜ : N0 → N0 such that K˜n ≤ Kn for all n ≥ 2, and the
corresponding γ˜n defined through
K˜n =
logn + (k − 2) log logn
1 − µ + γ˜n , (51)
satisfies lim
n→∞γ˜n = ∞.
Proof of Proposition A.1. We prove this Proposition by con-
structing a scaling K˜n as follows. Let
K˜n := min
{⌈
2 logn
1 − µ
⌉
,Kn
}
, n = 2, 3, . . . . (52)
By virtue of this definition, we have K˜n ≤ Kn for all n. Also, the
mapping K˜ : N0 → N0 is a scaling with 2 ≤ K˜n < n ∀n ≥ 2. From
(51) and (52), we have
γ˜n = min {⌈logn − (k − 2) log logn⌉,γn } . (53)
Since lim
n→∞γn = +∞, it is easy to see that limn→∞γ˜n = +∞. Also, since
γ˜n ≤ ⌈logn⌉ for all n, we have γn = O(logn). Consequently, we see
that the auxiliary scaling K˜ : N0 → N0 is indeed admissible as per
Definition 4.2. We note that the same parameter µ is used under
both scalings. □
A reduction step. Let the inhomogeneous random K-out graph
with n nodes and parameters K˜n , µ with K˜n defined through (52)
be denoted as H(n; µ, K˜n ). Next, we present a way to infer the
one-law for k-connectivity of H(n; µ,Kn ) from the connectivity of
H(n; µ, K˜n ) in the regime when γn → +∞ through the succeeding
Proposition.
Proposition A.2 (Coupling). Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0,
then for any scaling K˜ : N0 → N0 such that K˜n ≤ Kn for all n, we
have
P[H(n; µ,Kn )is k-connected] ≥ P[H(n; µ, K˜n )is k-connected].
Proof of Proposition A.2. The proof involves showing the ex-
istence of a coupling between the graphsH(n; µ,Kn ) andH(n; µ, K˜n )
such that the edge set of H(n; µ, K˜n ) is contained in the edge set of
H(n; µ,Kn ). The proof hinges on the observation thatk-connectivity
is amonotone-increasing property, i.e., a propertywhich holds upon
addition of edges to the graph (see [28, p. 13]). We will in fact show
that
P[H(n; µ,Kn ) has property P] ≥ P[H(n; µ, K˜n ) has property P]
(54)
for any monotone property P. In order to prove that the edge set
of H(n; µ, K˜n ) is contained in H(n; µ,Kn ), we show that we can
construct H(n; µ,Kn ) by adding edges to H(n; µ, K˜n ) as follows.
Recall that during the construction of H(n; µ,Kn ), each node is
first assigned a type corresponding to which it chooses neighbors
uniformly at random. In particular, type-1 (resp., type-2) nodes pick
1 (resp., Kn ) nodes. An equivalent way to construct H(n; µ,Kn ) is
as follows. The nodes are first initialized as type-1 (resp, type-2)
independently with probability µ (resp., 1 − µ). In the first round,
type-1 (resp., type-2) nodes pick 1 (resp., K˜n ) neighbors. In the
second round, each type-2 node picks additional Kn − K˜n ≥ 0
neighbors chosen uniformly at random from the remainingn−1−K˜n
nodes that it did not pick in the first round. The orientations of
the edges drawn in the two rounds are ignored to yield H(n; µ,Kn ).
From this construction, it is evident that the edge set of H(n; µ, K˜n )
is contained in the edge set of H(n; µ,Kn ). Through this coupling
argument, we see that (54) holds for any monotone increasing
property P. Since k-connectivity is monotonic-increasing upon
addition of edges, the proof of Proposition A.2 is completed. □
Now that we have established Propositions A.1 and A.2, we can
proceed with proving Lemma 4.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Suppose, for any given parameters (µ,Kn )
the sequence γn defined through (7) is such that γn → +∞. From
Proposition A.1, there exists an admissible scaling K˜ : N0 → N0
such that K˜n ≤ Kn ,∀n and the corresponding γ˜n → +∞. If the
conditional statement in Lemma 4.1 holds, i.e., if we have
lim
n→∞P[H(n; µ, K˜n ) is k-connected ] = 1,
then it follows from Proposition A.2 that
lim
n→∞P[H(n; µ,Kn ) is k-connected ] = 1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1. □
B SOME USEFUL FACTS
Here, we present some facts which will be frequently invoked in
the succeeding analysis. Consider an admissible scaling such that
γn defined through (7) satisfies γn → +∞. From the Definition 4.2
of admissible scaling, we have γn = O(logn). Consequently, from
(7) it is plain that we have
Kn = Θ(logn). (55)
under the assumptions enforced in Proposition 4.3.
For all x ∈ R, we have
1 ± x ≤ e±x . (56)
For 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 we have
1 − x2 ≥ e
−x , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (57)
Moreover, for 0 ≤ x < 1 and for a sequence y = 0, 1, 2 . . . , we have
1 − xy ≤ (1 − x)y ≤ 1 − xy + 12x
2y2. (58)
A proof of this fact can be found in [48, Fact 2]. For 0 ≤ m ≤ n1 ≤
n2,n1,n2 ∈ N0, we have(n1
m
)(n2
m
) = m−1∏
i=0
(
n1 − i
n2 − i
)
≤
(
n1
n2
)m
. (59)
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Using(59) and (56), we have(n−ℓ
r
)(n
r
) ≤ (n − ℓ
n
)r
≤ exp
{−rℓ
n
}
. (60)
From [10, Fact 4.1], we have that for r = 1, 2, . . . , ⌊ n2 ⌋, we have(
n
r
)
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
(61)
Combining (60) and (61), we get(
n − ℓ
r
)
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
exp
{−rℓ
n
}
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
. (62)
For any ℓ = 0, 1, . . . we have(
n
ℓ
)
=
nℓ
ℓ! (1 + o(1)). (63)
Recall from Table 2 thatXt denotes the event that all nodes inT are
type-t where t = 1, 2. Note that the event {Ei j |vi ,vj ∈ T are type-t}
is same as the event {Ei j | vi ,vj ∈ T ,Xt }. Therefore,
P[Ei j | vi ,vj ∈ T ,Xt ] (64)
= 1 − (1 − P[i ∈ Γn, j |vi ,vj ∈ T ,Xt ])(1 − P[j ∈ Γn,i |vi ,vj ∈ T ,Xt ])
= 1 −
(
1 − Kt
n − 1
)2
=
2Kt
n − 1 −
(
Kt
n − 1
)2
. (65)
Moreover,
P[Ei j | vj is type-t]
= 1 − (1 − P[i ∈ Γn, j | vj is type-t]) (1 − P[j ∈ Γn,i ])
= 1 −
(
1 − Kt
n − 1
) (
1 − ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1
)
=
⟨Kn⟩
n − 1 +
Kt
n − 1 −
⟨Kn⟩Kt
(n − 1)2 . (66)
C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3
In this section we show that each of the partial sums corresponding
to the three regimes outlined in Section 5.3 (see (50)) approach zero
as n gets large. This then yields the one-law in Theorem 3.1 through
the sufficient condition (23). Recall that we have (55) under the
assumptions enforced assumptions on the scaling Kn : N0 → N0
(i.e., that γn = ω(1), and γn = O(logn)).
C.1 Range 1: 2 ≤ r ≤ Kn − ℓ
In this regime we evaluate the following partial sum in (50) corre-
sponding to 2 ≤ r ≤ Kn − ℓ.
Kn−ℓ∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
µrP[B | X1]P[C | X1]P[DST]. (67)
Our strategy involves obtaining upper bounds onP[B | X1],P[C | X1]
and P[DST]. We first upper bound P[B | X1] using Lemma 5.3 and
(66) with t = 1 as follows.
P[B | X1] ≤ r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1 +
1
n − 1 −
⟨Kn⟩
(n − 1)2
)ℓ
,
= r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n
)ℓ ( n
n − 1
)ℓ (
1 + 1⟨Kn⟩ −
1
n − 1
)ℓ
,
= r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n
)ℓ
(1 + o(1)) (68)
where (68) follows from (55) and the fact that( n
n − 1
)ℓ ≤ exp { ℓ
n − 1
}
= 1 + o(1)
since ℓ is finite (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k − 1).
Next, we upper bound P[C | X1] using Lemma 5.5 with t = 1 and
(65).
P[C | X1] ≤ r r−2
(
2
n − 1 −
1
(n − 1)2
)r−1
≤ r r−2
(
2
n − 1
)r−1
≤ r r−2
(
2
n
)r−1 ( n
n − 1
)r−1
≤ r r−2
(
2
n
)r−1
exp
{
r − 1
n − 1
}
(69)
= r r−2
(
2
n
)r−1
(1 + o(1)) (70)
where (69) follows from (56), and (70) follows from the fact that
r ≤ Kn = O(logn) on the range considered here.
Recall that DST is the event that nodes in S do not choose a
neighbor in T . For each r = 2, . . . , ⌊ n2 ⌋, we can condition on the
types of nodes in S to get
P[DST]
=
(
µ
(
1 − r
n − 1
)
+ (1 − µ)
(n−r−1
Kn
)(n−1
Kn
) )n−(ℓ+r ) (71)
≤
(
µ
(
1 − r
n − 1
)
+ (1 − µ)
(
1 − r
n − 1
)Kn )n−(ℓ+r )
(72)
=
(
1 − r
n − 1
)n−(ℓ+r ) (
µ + (1 − µ)
(
1 − r
n − 1
)Kn−1)n−(ℓ+r )
≤
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r ) (
µ + (1 − µ)
(
1 − r
n
)Kn−1)n−(ℓ+r )
=
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r ) (
1 − (1 − µ)
(
1 −
(
1 − r
n
)Kn−1))n−(ℓ+r )
(73)
where (72) follows from (59). Note that for an admissible scaling,
Kn = O(logn). Thus, for r ≤ Kn − ℓ, we have rn = o(1) and
r (Kn−1)
n = o(1). Using (58) with x = rn we get
P[DST]
≤
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r )
·
(
1 − (1 − µ)
(
1 −
(
1 − r (Kn − 1)
n
+
r2(Kn − 1)2
2n2
)))n−(ℓ+r )
=
(
1 − r
n
)n−r (
1 − r
n
)−ℓ
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·
(
1 − (1 − µ)
(
r (Kn − 1)
n
− r
2(Kn − 1)2
2n2
))n−(ℓ+r )
≤ (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
(74)
· exp
{
−(1 − µ) (n − (ℓ + r ))
(
r (Kn − 1)
n
− r
2(Kn − 1)2
2n2
)}
= (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
(75)
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − (ℓ + r ))r (Kn − 1)
n
(
1 − r (Kn − 1)2n
)}
= (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)
(
1 − r (Kn − 1)2n
)}
· exp
{
(1 − µ)(ℓ + r )r (Kn − 1)
n
(
1 − r (Kn − 1)2n
)}
,
where (74) follows from (56) and the fact that r ≤ Kn = O(logn).
Further, when γn → ∞, from scaling condition (7), we have (1 −
µ)(Kn − 1) ≥ logn for all n sufficiently large. On that range, we
have
P[DST]
≤ (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
exp {−r logn} exp
{
r2 logn(Kn − 1)
2n
}
· exp
{
(1 − µ)(ℓ + r )
(
r (Kn − 1)
n
) (
1 − r (Kn − 1)2n
)}
(76)
= (1 + o(1))
(n − r
n
)n−r
n−r (1 + o(1)) . (77)
as we note that Kn = O(logn) for an admissible scaling and r ≤ Kn
on the range under consideration. Combining (62), (63), (68), (70),
(77), we have for all r = 2, 3, . . . ,Kn − ℓ that
µr
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X1]P[C | X1]P[DST]
≤ µr n
ℓ
ℓ!
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n
)ℓ
r r−2
(
2
n
)r−1 (n − r
n
)n−r
· n−r (1 + o(1))
=
(2µ)r
2ℓ!
r ℓ−2⟨Kn⟩ℓ
nr−1
(1 + o(1))
=
2µ2
ℓ!
(
2µ
n
)r−2 r ℓ−2⟨Kn⟩ℓ
n
(1 + o(1))
=
(
2µ
n
)r−2
o(1), (78)
where (78) follows from r ≤ Kn = O(logn). In order to show that
the summation (67) is o(1), we upper bound it by an infinite geo-
metric progression wherein each term of the geometric progression
is non-negative and strictly less than 1. Note that since (78) holds
for all r such that 2 ≤ r ≤ Kn − ℓ, substituting in (67) we obtain
Kn−ℓ∑
r=2
µr
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X1]P[C | X1]P[DST]
≤ o(1)
Kn−ℓ∑
r=2
(
2µ
n
)r−2
≤ o(1)
∞∑
r=0
(
2µ
n
)r
=
1
1 − 2µn
o(1)
= o(1). (79)
C.2 Range 2: Kn − ℓ < r ≤ ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋
Here, we consider the partial sum in (50) corresponding to the range
Kn − ℓ < r ≤ ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋, i.e.,
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X2]P[C | X2]P[DST] (80)
From (55), we know that Kn = Θ(logn) and therefore in this range
r ≤ ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋ ≤ ⌊n/2⌋. As noted in Section 5.3, our strategy in-
volves combining upper bounds on P[B | X2], P[C | X2] and P[DST]
obtained using Lemmas 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6. From Lemma 5.3 and (66)
with t = 2,
P[B | X2] ≤ r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1 +
Kn
n − 1 −
⟨Kn⟩Kn
(n − 1)2
)ℓ
≤ r ℓ
( ⟨Kn⟩
n − 1 +
Kn
n − 1
)ℓ
Substituting ⟨Kn⟩ = µ + (1 − µ)Kn , we get
P[B | X2] ≤ r ℓ
( (2 − µ)Kn
n − 1
)ℓ (
1 + µ(2 − µ)Kn
)ℓ
= r ℓ
( (2 − µ)Kn
n
)ℓ
(1 + o(1)) (81)
where (81) follows from (55) and the fact that (n/(n − 1))ℓ = 1+o(1).
Next, we bound P[C | X2] using Lemma 5.5 and (65) with t = 2.
We get
P[C | X2] ≤ r r−2
(
2Kn
n − 1 −
K2n
(n − 1)2
)r−1
= r r−2
(
2Kn
n
)r−1 (
1 + 1
n − 1 −
nKn
2(n − 1)2
)r−1
≤ r r−2
(
2Kn
n
)r−1
(82)
where (82) follows from (55).
Next, we find an upper bound on P[DST]. Note that rn ≤ 1/(Kn −
1) = o(1) in view of (55). Consequently, we can use (58) with x = rn .
Also, it still holds that (1−r/n)−ℓ = 1+o(1). Thus, proceeding as in
Range 1, we can upper bound P[DST] by undergoing the sequence
of steps from (71) through (75) to obtain
P[DST] ≤ (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
(83)
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − (ℓ + r ))r (Kn − 1)
n
(
1 − r (Kn − 1)2n
)}
.
In this range, we have r ≤ n(Kn−1) and thus
r (Kn−1)
2n ≤ 12 , or
equivalently 1 − r (Kn−1)2n ≥ 12 . Further, since r ≤ n−ℓ2 , we have
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n − (ℓ + r ) ≥ n−ℓ2 . Using these observations in (83), we get
P[DST]
≤ (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − ℓ)r (Kn − 1)4n
}
= (1 + o(1))
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)4
}
· exp
{
ℓ(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)
4n
}
= O(1)
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)4
}
, (84)
where in the last step we used the fact that exp
{
ℓ(1−µ)r (Kn−1)
4n
}
=
O(1) since r (Kn−1)n ≤ 1. Combining (62), (63), (81), (82) and (84), we
get(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X2]P[C | X2]P[DST]
≤ O(1)n
ℓ
ℓ!
(n
r
)r (
1 − r
n
)−(n−r )
r ℓ
( (2 − µ)Kn
n
)ℓ
r r−2
(
2Kn
n
)r−1
·
(
1 − r
n
)n−r
exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)4
}
= O(1)nr ℓ−2Kr+ℓ−1n 2r exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)4
}
. (85)
Substituting (85) in (80), we get
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X2]P[C | X2]P[DST], (86)
= O(1)nKℓ−1n
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
r ℓ−22rKrn exp
{
−(1 − µ)r (Kn − 1)4
}
.
≤ O(1)nKℓ−1n
(
n
Kn − 1
)ℓ−2
·
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
2Kn exp
{
−(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)4
})r
= O(1)nℓ−1Kn
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
2Kn exp
{
−(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)4
})r
≤ O(1)nℓ−1Kn
∞∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
2Kn exp
{
−(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)4
})r
(87)
Since lim
n→∞Kn = ∞ we have
2Kn exp
{
−(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)4
}
= o(1) (88)
so that the infinite sum appearing at (87) is summable.
Thus, we get
⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋∑
r=Kn−ℓ+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[B | X2]P[C | X2]P[DST],
= O(1)nℓ−1Kn
(
2Kn exp
{
−(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)4
})Kn−ℓ+1
= O(1) exp
{
(ℓ − 1) logn + logKn + (Kn − ℓ + 1) log 2Kn
− (1 − µ)(Kn − 1)(Kn − ℓ + 1)4
}
= O(1) exp
{
−K
2
n (1 − µ)
4 (1 + o(1))
}
(89)
= o(1) (90)
where (89) and (90) both follow from Kn = Θ(logn), respectively.
C.3 Range 3: ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋ + 1 < r ≤ ⌊(n − ℓ)/2⌋
Here, we will consider the partial sum in (50) with index r over the
range ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋ + 1 < r ≤ ⌊(n − ℓ)/2⌋; i.e., the term
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[DST]P[DTS]. (91)
Note that since Kn = Θ(logn), this range is non-empty. Condition-
ing on the types of nodes in T , it is easy to verify that for each r in
2, . . . , ⌊ n2 ⌋ we have
P[DTS] =
(
µ
(r−1+ℓ
1
)(n−1
1
) + (1 − µ) (r−1+ℓKn )(n−1
Kn
) )r
≤
(
µ
(
r − 1 + ℓ
n − 1
)
+ (1 − µ)
(
r − 1 + ℓ
n − 1
)Kn )r
(92)
= µr
(
r − 1 + ℓ
n − 1
)r (
1 + 1 − µ
µ
(
r − 1 + ℓ
n − 1
)Kn−1)r
≤ µr
(
r + ℓ
n
)r (
1 + 1 − µ
µ
(
r + ℓ
n
)Kn−1)r
(93)
≤ µr
(
r + ℓ
n
)r
exp
{
1 − µ
µ
r
(
r + ℓ
n
)Kn−1}
(94)
where (92) and (94) follow from (59) and (56), respectively, and (93)
follows from the r + ℓ ≤ n.
We bound P[DST] by using the sequence of steps from (71)
through (73) as in range 1. We get
P[DST]
≤
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r ) (
1 − (1 − µ)
(
1 −
(
1 − r
n
)Kn−1))n−(ℓ+r )
≤
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r ) (
1 − (1 − µ)
(
1 − exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
}))n−(ℓ+r )
≤
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r )
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − (ℓ + r ))
(
1 − exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
})}
(95)
using (56). Let Zn,r be defined as
Zn,r = exp
{
1 − µ
µ
r
(
r + ℓ
n
)Kn−1}
(96)
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − (ℓ + r ))
(
1 − exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
})}
.
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Substituting (94), (95), and (96) in (91), we get
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= n⌊Kn−1 ⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[DST]P[DTS]
≤
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
µr
(
r + ℓ
n
)r (
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r )
Zn,r
≤
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
nℓ
ℓ! (1 + o(1))
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
µr
(
r + ℓ
n
)r
·
(
1 − r
n
)n−(ℓ+r )
Zn,r (97)
=
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
O(1)nℓµr
(
1 + ℓ
r
)r (
1 − r
n
)−ℓ
Zn,r
≤
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
O(1)nℓµr 2ℓeℓZn,r (98)
=
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
O(1)µrnℓZn,r , (99)
where (97) follows from (62) and (63), (98) is apparent from r ≤ n/2
implying (1 − r/n)−ℓ ≤ 2ℓ and (56) implying (1 + ℓ/r ) ≤ eℓ .
Next, we derive an upper bound forZn,r . Our goal is to show that
Zn,r goes to zero as n → ∞ for each r in ⌊n/(Kn − 1)⌋ + 1 < r ≤
⌊(n − ℓ)/2⌋. The approach used in this part is reminiscent of some
of the techniques used for proving 1-connectivity of H(n; µ,Kn ) in
[10]. Recall that ℓ ≤ k where k is finite, and r/n ≤ 1/2 on the range
considered. Further, we have r+ℓ ≤ (n + ℓ)/2 ≤ (n + n/2)/2 = 3n/4.
Thus,
r
(
r + ℓ
n
)Kn−1
≤ n2 (0.75)
Kn−1. (100)
Recall that in Range 3, r (Kn−1)n > 1 and therefore
exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
}
< e−1. (101)
Using (100) and (101) in (96), we see that
Zn,r ≤ exp
{ (1 − µ)
µ
n
2 (0.75)
Kn−1 − (1 − µ)(n − (ℓ + r ))
(
1 − e−1
)}
Further, noting that n − (ℓ + r ) > (n − ℓ)/2, we get
Zn,r
≤ exp
{ (1 − µ)
µ
n
2 (0.75)
Kn−1 − (1 − µ)n − ℓ2
(
1 − e−1
)}
= exp
{
−(1 − µ)n2
(
1 − e−1 − 0.75
Kn−1
µ
)}
exp
{ (1 − µ)ℓ(1 − e−1)
2
}
= exp
{
−(1 − µ)n2
(
1 − e−1 − o(1)
)}
O(1) (102)
= o(1) (103)
where (102) is a consequence of Kn = O(logn) and the fact that ℓ is
finite. As before, we use an infinite geometric progression to upper
bound the summation in (99) using (103). Combining (99) and (103),
we obtain
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[DST,DTS]
≤ o(1) nℓ
∞∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
µr
= o(1) nℓµn/(Kn−1)
= o(1), (104)
where (104) follows from the fact that
nℓµn/(Kn−1) = nℓµn/Θ(logn) = o(1).
in view of (55), µ < 1, and ℓ being finite. We thus conclude that
⌊(n−ℓ)/2⌋∑
r= ⌊n/(Kn−1)⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
) (
n − ℓ
r
)
P[DST]P[DTS] = o(1). (105)
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Combining (79), (90), and (105), it
is evident that all of the three partial sums approach zero as n
approaches∞ and thus we have proved the sufficient condition (23)
for k-connectivity. The proof of Proposition 4.3 is now complete.
□
D PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Recall thatCmax(n; µ,Kn ) denotes the largest connected component
of H(n; µ,Kn ). In this section, we will prove Theorem 3.3 which
states that if Kn ≥ 3 for all n, then whp Cmax(n; µ,Kn ) contains all
but finitely many of the nodes. The proof for this theorem goes
through a sequence of intermediate Lemmas. We start off by for-
mally defining a cut as a set of nodes that is isolated from the rest
of the graph.
Definition D.1 (Cut). [23, Definition 6.3] Consider a graphG with
the vertex set N . A cut is defined as a non-empty subset S ⊂ N of
nodes that is isolated from the rest of the graph. Namely, S ⊂ N is
a cut if there is no edge between S and Sc = N \ S .
It is clear from Definition D.1 that if S is a cut, then so is Sc. It is
important to note the distinction between a cut as defined above
and the notion of a connected component given in Definition 3.2.
A connected component is isolated from the rest of the nodes by
Definition 3.2 and therefore it is also a cut. However, nodes within a
cut may not be connected meaning that not every cut is a connected
component. Let En (µ,Kn ; S) denote the event that S ⊂ N is a cut
in H(n; µ,Kn ) as per Definition D.1. Event En (µ,Kn ; S) occurs if no
nodes in S pick neighbors in Sc and no nodes in S pick neighbors
in Sc. Thus, we have
En (µ,Kn ; S) =
⋂
i ∈S
⋂
j ∈Sc
({
i < Γn, j
} ∩ {j < Γn,i }) .
LetZ(xn ; µ,Kn ) denote the event thatH(n; µ,Kn ) has no cut S ⊂ N
with size xn ≤ |S | ≤ n − xn where x : N0 → N0 is a sequence
such that xn ≤ n/2 ∀n. In other words, Z(xn ; µ,Kn ) is the event
that there are no cuts in H(n; µ,Kn ) whose size falls in the range
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[xn ,n − xn ]. Since if S is a cut, then so is Sc (i.e., if there is a cut of
sizem then there must be a cut of size n −m), we see that
Z(xn ; µ,Kn ) =
⋂
S ∈Pn : xn ≤ |S | ≤ ⌊ n2 ⌋
(En (µ,Kn ; S))c ,
where Pn denotes the collection of all non-empty subsets of N .
Taking the complement of both sides and using a union bound we
get
P
[(Z(xn ; µ,Kn ))c] ≤ ∑
S ∈Pn :xn ≤ |S | ≤ ⌊ n2 ⌋
P[En (µ,Kn ; S)]
=
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
r=xn
©­«
∑
S ∈Pn,r
P[En (µ,Kn ; S)]ª®¬ , (106)
where Pn,r denotes the collection of all subsets ofN with exactly r
elements. For each r = 1, . . . ,n, we simplify the notation by writing
En,r (µ,Kn ; S) = En (µ,Kn ; {1, . . . , r }). From the exchangeability of
the node labels and associated random variables, we get
P[En (µ,Kn ; S)] = P[En,r (µ,Kn )], S ∈ Pn,r .
Noting that |Pn,r | =
(n
r
)
, we obtain∑
S ∈Pn,r
P[En (µ,Kn ; S)] =
(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )].
Substituting into (106) we obtain
P
[(Z(xn ; µ,Kn ))c] ≤ ⌊ n2 ⌋∑
r=xn
(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )]. (107)
The next result shows that if Kn = 3 for all n and 1/2 < µ <
1, then a.a.s. (Z(xn ; µ,Kn ))c does not take place for any xn =
ω(1). In other words,Z(xn ; µ,Kn )) takes place a.a.s., meaning that
H(n; µ,Kn ) does not have any cut with size in the range [xn ,n−xn ]
whp. As shall be seen in Lemma D.3, the occurrence of event
Z(xn ; µ,Kn )) in turn implies that |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n − xn .
Proposition D.2. Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn = 3 for all n and µ such that 1/2 < µ < 1. Then for any sequence
x : N0 → N0 such that xn = ω(1), we have
lim
n→∞P
[(Z(xn ; µ,Kn ))c] = 0 (108)
Proof of Proposition D.2. In view of (107), the proof for Propo-
sition D.2 will follow upon showing
lim
n→∞
⌊n/2⌋∑
r=xn
(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )] = 0. (109)
We establish (109) using some steps similar to those introduced
in proving Theorem 3.1. In Section 5, we defined for each ℓ =
1, . . . ,k−1 the eventDℓ,r as the set {ℓ+1, . . . , ℓ+r } being isolated
in the graph generated upon deletion of a set U comprising of ℓ
nodes. Recall that En,r (µ,Kn ) is the event that nodes in {1, . . . , r }
are isolated from nodes in N \ {1, . . . , r }. Now, note that the event
En,r (µ,Kn ) is the same as the event Dℓ,r for ℓ = 0. Therefore, the
upper bound derived for P[Dℓ,r] can be evaluated at ℓ = 0 to obtain
an upper bound for P[En,r (µ,Kn )]. Recall from Table 2 that we had
suppressed the subscript {ℓ, r } and defined events DST and DTS
such that Dℓ,r corresponded to their intersection. Since Kn = 3
and the index r in the summation in equation (109) is less than n/2,
we have r ≤ n/(Kn − 1). We use (94) and (95) with ℓ = 0 together
with (61) to obtain(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )]
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n − r
)n−r
µr
( r
n
)r
exp
{
1 − µ
µ
r
( r
n
)Kn−1} (
1 − r
n
)n−r
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − r )
(
1 − exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
})}
= µr exp
{
1 − µ
µ
r
( r
n
)Kn−1}
· exp
{
−(1 − µ)(n − r )
(
1 − exp
{−r (Kn − 1)
n
})}
. (110)
Now using r/n ≤ 1/2, Kn = 3, and (57) in (110), we get(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )]
≤ µr exp
{
1 − µ
µ
r
(
1
4
)
− (1 − µ)(n − r )
( r
n
)}
.
We can further use the fact that r ≤ n/2 and its consequence
−n−rn ≤ −1/2 to obtain(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )] ≤ µr exp
{
1 − µ
4µ r − (1 − µ)
( r
2
)}
= µr exp
{
−(1 − µ)r 2µ − 14µ
}
. (111)
Now, using (111) we get
⌊n/2⌋∑
r=xn
(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )] ≤
⌊n/2⌋∑
r=xn
µr exp
{
−(1 − µ)r 2µ − 14µ
}
≤
∞∑
r=xn
(
µ exp
{
−(1 − µ)(2µ − 1)4µ
})r
.
(112)
Observe that for any 1/2 < µ < 1, the above geometric series has
each term strictly less than one, and thus it is summable. This gives
⌊n/2⌋∑
r=xn
(
n
r
)
P[En,r (µ,Kn )] ≤
(
µ exp
{
− (1−µ)(2µ−1)4µ
})xn
1 − µ exp
{
− (1−µ)(2µ−1)4µ
} = o(1)
for any xn = ω(1). □
The following Lemma establishes the relevance of the event
Z(xn ; µ,Kn ) in obtaining a lower bound for the size of the largest
connected component.
Lemma D.3. For any sequence x : N0 → N0 such that xn ≤ ⌊n/3⌋
for all n,
we have
Z(xn ; µ,Kn ) =⇒ |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| > n − xn .
Proof of Lemma D.3. Assume thatZ(xn ; µ,Kn ) takes place, i.e.,
there is no cut in H(n; µ,Kn ) of size in the range [xn ,n − xn ]. Since
a connected component is also a cut, this also means that
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Mansi Sood and Osman Yağan
there is no connected component of size in the range [xn ,n−xn ].
Since every graph has at least one connected component, it either
holds that the largest one has size |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| > n−xn , or that
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| < xn .
We now show that it must be the case that |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| >
n − xn under the assumption that xn ≤ n/3.
Assume towards a contradiction that |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| < xn
meaning that the size of each connected component is less than
xn . Note that the union of any set of connected components is
either a cut, or it spans the entire network. If no cut exists with
size in the range [xn ,n − xn ], the union of any set of connected
components should also have a size outside of [xn ,n−xn ]. Also, the
union of all connected components has size n. Let C1,C2, . . . ,Cmax
denote the set of connected components in increasing size order.
Letm ≥ 1 be the largest integer such that ∑mi=1 |Ci | < xn . Since
|Cm+1 | < xn , we have xn ≤ ∑m+1i=1 |Ci | < xn + xn ≤ 2n/3 ≤ n − xn .
This means that ∪m+1i=1 Ci constitutes a cut with size in the range[xn ,n−xn ] contradicting the eventZ(xn ; µ,Kn ). We thus conclude
that ifZ(xn ; µ,Kn ) takes place with xn ≤ n/3, then we must have
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| > n − xn . □
Combining Proposition D.2 and Lemma D.3 we already see that if
Kn = 3 ∀n and 1/2 < µ < 1, then |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n−xn whp for
any sequence xn = ω(1). Using LemmaD.4 presented below, wewill
extend this result to any 0 < µ < 1 and any scaling K : N0 → N0
satisfying Kn ≥ 3 ∀n. This result formalizes the intuition that the
size of the largest connected component would increase if more
edges are added to a graph.
Lemma D.4. Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and K˜ : N0 → N0
and µ, µ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that Kn ≤ K˜n for all n, and µ˜ ≤ µ. For any
sequence x : N0 → N0 we have that
if
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n − xn whp,
then
|Cmax(n; µ˜, K˜n )| ≥ n − xn whp.
Proof of Lemma D.4. Recall from (54) that for any monotone
increasing property P (i.e., a property which holds upon addition
of edges to the graph) we have
P[H(n; µ˜, K˜n ) has property P] ≥ P[H(n; µ,Kn ) has property P]
(113)
if there exists a coupling under which H(n; µ,Kn ) is a spanning
subgraph of H(n; µ˜, K˜n ); i.e., if we can generate an instantiation
of H(n; µ˜, K˜n ) by adding edges to an instantiation of H(n; µ,Kn ). It
is plain that the property |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n − xn is monotone
increasing upon edge addition. Thus, in order to establish this
Lemma, we just need to establish the aforementioned coupling.
Consider an instantiation of H(n; µ,Kn ), i.e., each of the n nodes
is independently assigned as type-1 (resp., type-2) with probability
µ (resp., 1 − µ) and then type-1 (resp., type-2) nodes draw edges to
1 (resp. Kn ) nodes chosen uniformly at random. From this instan-
tiation, we can generate an instantiation of H(n; µ˜, K˜n ) as follows.
First, let each type-2 node choose an additional K˜n − Kn ≥ 0 dis-
tinct nodes uniformly at random from among nodes that were not
chosen by it initially. Second, we let each type-1 node select an
additional K˜n − 1 distinct nodes uniformly at random from among
nodes that were not chosen by it initially with probability µ−µ˜µ ≥ 0
(and no extra choices with the complementary probability µ˜µ ). After
these additional choices are made, we draw an undirected edge
between each pair of nodes where at least one picked the other.
Clearly, this process creates a graph whose edge set is a superset of
the edge set of the realization of H(n; µ,Kn ) that we started with.
In addition, in the new graph, the probability of a node picking
only one other node (i.e., being type-1) is given by µ µ˜µ = µ˜. With
the complementary probability 1 − µ˜, a node picks K˜n nodes (i.e.,
it will be type-2). We thus conclude that the new graph obtained
constitutes a realization of H(n; µ˜, K˜n ). Since, the initial realization
of H(n; µ,Kn ) was arbitrary, this establishes the desired coupling
argument and we conclude that (113) holds. The proof of Lemma
D.4 is now complete. □
Proof of Theorem 3.3 . Now,we have set up all the requisite in-
gredients for establishing Theorem 3.3. Combining Proposition D.2
and Lemma D.3 we see that if Kn = 3 ∀n and µ > 1/2, then for
any sequence xn = ω(1) we have |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n − ω(1) whp.
Using Lemma D.4, we have that if Kn ≥ 3 ∀n and 0 < µ < 1, then
for any sequence xn = ω(1)we have |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≥ n−xn whp.
In other words, the number of nodes outside the largest connected
component, given by n − |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )|, satisfies
n − |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| ≤ xn whp for any xn = ω(1) (114)
This is then equivalent to having that the numbern−|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )|
of nodes outside the largest connected component is bounded, i.e.,
O(1), with high probability. This fact is sometimes stated using the
probabilistic big-O notation, Op : A random sequence fn = Op (1)
if for any ε > 0 there exists finite integers M(ε) and n(ε) such
that P[fn > M(ε)] < ε for all n ≥ n(ε). In fact, we see from [18,
Lemma 3] that (114) is equivalent to having
n − |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = Op (1)
Here, we equivalently state this as
n − |Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = O(1) whp,
giving readily
|Cmax(n; µ,Kn )| = n −O(1) whp.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3. □
